T he United States has been fi ghting the war on drugs for decades, across the nation and throughout the hemisphere. Police offi cers, prosecutors, doctors, social workers, soldiers, counselors and countless others have invested their energy and expertise-and have even risked their lives-to combat drug traffi cking and drug abuse. Their efforts are impressive and appreciated.
in Latin America, giving particular attention to how counterdrug policies have affected the region's militaries, police forces, and judicial and legal systems. The book includes detailed studies on U.S. military and police drug control assistance programs, and case studies from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and the Caribbean, all major cultivation, production, or transit zones.
We found that in one nation after another, U.S. drug control policies are undermining human rights and democracy and causing enormous damage to some of the most vulnerable populations in the hemisphere. The United States' insistence on zero tolerance for drug crops has led to massive forced eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, often the principal source of income for impoverished farmers. With few alternatives available, these families are ratcheted down into deeper poverty when their most important cash crop is destroyed. The region's militaries, which have not been held accountable for widespread human rights abuses and authoritarian dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, have been brought back into domestic law enforcement because the local police forces are either incapable or too corrupt to deal with the threat from drug traffi cking and its associated violence.
As the focus of U.S. drug strategies shift, so does drug production and traffi cking, bringing the scourge of the drug trade to new parts of the hemisphere. Most decisions on national drug policies in Latin America are made under heavy U.S. pressure for stronger measures. This one-size-fi ts-all approach to drug strategy prevents countries from responding to local concerns and stifl es creative approaches.
Our study pointed to two major conclusions: fi rst, the supply-reduction model simply does not work; and second, this model has sparked confl ict, fueled human rights violations, and undermined democracy in countries where drugs are produced and traffi cked. These lessons should guide a new international drug control policy-one that gets at the roots of the drug problem by channeling more resources to treatment and education in the United States and to economic development in Latin America while continuing to go after the transnational criminal organizations that engage in larger-scale traffi cking of drugs, arms, and migrants, and then help foment corruption and economic distortions through money-laundering schemes and the strategic use of their assets.
We are not questioning the commitment or the integrity of those who work tirelessly, against daunting odds, to keep drugs off America's streets. We are not saying that fi ghting drugs is impossible and that we should just give up. On the contrary-we are saying that we can do better. More effective and humane approaches to the enormous problems of drug traffi cking and illicit drug use do exist. But achieving success will require an honest assessment of whether or not we are moving closer to our goals-and if not, what we need to be doing differently. We must go beyond the mentality of fear shared by U.S. policymakers and the public at large that has made any challenges to current drug policy taboo.
No perfect solutions exist. It is unlikely that illicit drug use can be eliminated in the foreseeable future, or that transnational crimes like drug traffi cking can be completely stamped out. But if we can open up a debate, evaluate the problems and the range of possible strategies to confront them, and then implement the policies either proven or showing the most promise to be effective, we can meet our fundamental goal of reducing drug abuse in the United States. Along the way, we will ensure that in Latin America, U.S. drug control policies do not continue to violate human rights and civil liberties, spark social upheaval, and undermine democracy.
What follows are WOLA's main concerns, arguments, and policy recommendations. We hope that they provide new perspectives to our readers for thinking constructively and creatively about how to confront the extremely complex issue of international drug traffi cking, and in a way that is more effective at home and least harmful abroad.
The U.S. "War on Drugs"
The mid-1980s explosion of crack cocaine and its related violence in the United States set in motion many of the U.S. drug control policies still in effect today. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan fi rst declared illicit drugs to be a national security threat. Three years later, President George H. W. Bush launched the Andean Initiative as part of his strategy for an intensifi ed drug war. The centerpiece of the Andean Initiative was to empower Latin American military and police forces to carry out counterdrug initiatives, and signifi cant U.S. training and support was provided to those forces willing to participate. At the same time, the Pentagon was designated by the U.S. Congress as the "single lead agency" for the detection and monitoring of illicit drug shipments into the United States. Because of the role given to Latin American and U.S. military forces, the term "militarization" became widely used to describe U.S. efforts. U.S. drug control policies are carried out through coordination between the United States and Latin American and Caribbean governments, often with input from the relevant bodies of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). Sometimes the programs are collaborative in nature. More often, however, the U.S. government uses its economic and diplomatic leverage to ensure cooperation, making use in particular of the annual "certifi cation" process, which denies U.S. aid and trade benefi ts to countries not viewed as doing their part to combat illicit drugs. Because of their dependence on economic aid and desire for trade agreements, many countries fi nd themselves obliged to adopt policies and programs supported by Washington.
The drug trade itself, and the violence it generates, has had a devastating impact throughout the region. Drug traffi cking breeds criminality, exacerbates criminal and political violence, and fuels armed groups. It greatly increases problems of citizen security, public order and ultimately law enforcement. Across the region, drug traffi cking-related corruption has further weakened national and local governments, judiciaries and police forces. Cocaine production damages the environment, and its profi ts distort local economies. Illicit drug use, once considered a problem of developed countries, is now rampant across the region. Violent crime associated with the drug trade escalates accordingly. The social fabric, particularly in poor urban areas where both drug use and drug-related violence tend to be highest, is torn apart.
Those advocating the supply-side approach to drug control argue that the problems related to illegal drug production and consumption would be even worse without the international counterdrug programs presently in place. If these programs were abandoned, they say, the situation would deteriorate and illicit drugs would be even more readily available-even a marginal impact resulting from these efforts is better than none. What is missing from this line of reasoning, however, is a frank assessment of the collateral damage caused by this approach, and whether such damage outweighs any as yet unproven positive impact of current programs.
Similarly, government offi cials point to the hectares of coca eradicated, the number of cocaine labs destroyed, how many arrests were made, or the amount of illicit drugs seized, as indicators of successful policy implementation. Such "body count" statistics may indeed make for good public relations and convey a sense of action, increasing the likelihood of continued resources at a time when many agencies face budget cuts. But they shed no light on whether the tactics used actually translate into progress toward achieving basic policy goals of reduced drug use in the United States. The standards commonly used for measuring the effectiveness of international drug policy are, quite simply, off the mark; 3 winning the "drug war" is as elusive today as it was when the effort was fi rst launched.
Fundamental Flaws in the Supply-side Approach U.S. offi cials routinely assert that international counterdrug programs are successful. Short-term tactical successes are indeed evident-coca crops are eradicated, traffi ckers are arrested, and shipments are intercepted. Nonetheless, total coca production has remained remarkably steady and there is no evidence demonstrating a signifi cant reduction in the supply of illicit drugs on U.S. city streets. To the contrarythe stability of illicit drugs' price and purity levels points to their continued accessibility.
The drug trade is more like a balloon than a battlefi eld-when one part of a balloon is squeezed, its contents are displaced to another. Similarly, when coca production is suppressed in one area, it quickly pops up somewhere else, disregarding national borders. Arrested drug lords are quickly replaced by others who move up the ranks; dismantled cartels are replaced by smaller, leaner operations that are harder to detect and deter. When drug-traffi cking routes are disrupted by intensive interdiction campaigns, they are simply shifted elsewhere.
Andean coca cultivation, as depicted by the State Department's own annual estimates, is remarkable for its stability at around 200,000 hectares per year (see chart on page 3). While the share of crops raised in each coca-producing country has fl uctuated, the total land area under cultivation each year has not varied dramatically. 4 Moreover, according to U.S. government statistics, the average yield of coca leaves per hectare has risen over time, so that even apparent declines in cultivated land area may not translate into less coca available for processing into cocaine. Evidence is already mounting of a shift in coca production within Colombia to new areas, as farmers fl ee massive fumigation campaigns, and coca production in Bolivia is again on the rise.
A similar phenomenon happens with arrests of traffi ckers. Removing one set of international drug dealers has often simply cleared the way for rivals and new entrants to the drug trade, rather than reducing the size of the drug market. Smashing the large Mexican and Colombian cartels led to the formation of groups that are smaller and harder to detect. Larger and more frequent drug seizures, often offered as evidence of policy success, are in fact inherently ambiguous indicators. They may instead refl ect increased drug production and traffi cking, as traffi ckers seek to compensate for their anticipated losses.
The U.S. strategy focuses on wiping out drugs at their source or seizing them in transit. The objective of this approach is to decrease their availability in the United States, by causing drug prices to rise and thus discouraging some percentage of potential buyers. Offi cial U.S. fi gures, however, show that cocaine's retail price dropped fairly steadily during the 1980s and early 1990s. The price never rebounded, even as purity rose and then stabilized. The same patterns hold true for heroin. These low and stable prices for cocaine and heroin that have prevailed over the last decade show that, despite U.S. efforts, the supply of drugs continues to be robust.
Serious evaluation of present policies and open-minded debate on drug control alternatives are sorely needed if we hope to make any progress. A more effective and more humane policy should be based on the recognition that, while controlling illicit drug abuse is a legitimate and important goal, drugs will be produced as long as there is demand for them. The goal should therefore be to reduce both demand and the damage that illicit drugs cause to individuals and society. Policymakers should seek to minimize the negative consequences at home and abroad of both illicit drug production and use and the strategies designed to curtail them.
The U.S. Drug War's Collateral Damage
The case studies collected by WOLA allowed for the identifi cation of issues and phenomena that occur in strikingly similar ways in most, if not all, of the countries studied. The following summarizes the primary conclusions drawn from our research in eight main areas, and presents recommendations for alternative policy options.
The role of the military
The increasing reliance on military forces to play a lead role in combating the illicit drug trade set off alarm bells for civilian leaders across the region. The experience of military coups, and perhaps most disturbingly, of massive human rights violations committed in the name of combating internal "subversion," was all too recent. In providing the resources, training and doctrinal justifi cation for militaries to play a signifi cant role in domestic counterdrug operations, the U.S. government was viewed as legitimating Latin American security forces in yet another internal security role, now directed at new enemies. And it did so even though suffi cient mechanisms for civilian control, transparency and accountability were-and remain-sorely lacking. environment the drug war became the vehicle for maintaining and in some cases expanding both the Pentagon's presence and its military-to-military relations with Latin American and Caribbean counterparts. Of particular concern, these programs legally circumvent traditional congressional oversight and monitoring requirements, as well as the State Department's role in determining the nature and content of foreign aid and overseeing its delivery.
Military forces do have a role to play in detecting and monitoring the fl ow of illicit drugs. Their involvement in border, aerial and maritime interdiction efforts fi ts clearly into the military's traditional mission. Provided that these programs are carried out under the direction of civilian leaders, with appropriate oversight, transparency, and human rights safeguards, they do not hinder democratic development. However, through its drug policy, the United States has promoted the insertion of Latin American military forces into domestic law enforcement and internal security operations.
In every country studied that receives signifi cant U.S. counterdrug assistance, U.S. support was instrumental in bringing the military into a domestic law enforcement role and has created a confusion of roles and confl icts between military and police forces. A related problem is U.S. military training of foreign police forces. Such training goes directly against efforts across the region during the 1980s and 1990s to bring police forces under civilian control. Moreover, funding for this training is largely provided by the U.S. Defense Department budget and hence circumvents both oversight and human rights safeguards. Training of local police forces by U.S. Special Forces is of particular concern.
The "confi dential" nature of counterdrug programs can further exacerbate problems of lack of civilian oversight and impunity within military forces, thereby contributing to the proliferation of corruption when military personnel are brought into more direct contact with the drug trade.
Policy Recommendations
 The U.S. government, through its counterdrug policy as well as its interaction with regional militaries, should promote the adoption of and adherence to the principle of Posse Comitatus which, as written in U.S. law, forbids the military from assuming internal police roles and tasks.
 All authority for foreign military training and assistance should be returned to the State Department, which should have sole responsibility for overseeing such programs in order to ensure that they fi t within overarching U.S. foreign policy objectives and come under established oversight procedures.
 No branch of the U.S. government, including the Defense Department, should provide assistance, training or any other support to military forces for domestic drug enforcement efforts.
 The U.S. military should not train local police forces. Training of local police by U.S. Special Forces is particularly problematic and should be suspended immediately.
The role of the police
Confronting criminal networks, whether of drug traffi ckers, money launderers, smugglers, or others, is primarily a law enforcement task-and that task is formidable in Latin America and the Caribbean today. As citizen security concerns grow, both local communities and governments look to the police-and sometimes military forces-to impose tough law and order measures. In this context, it is easy to understand why governments resort to harsh and repressive law enforcement measures. However, experience with such practices to date indicates that the short-term successes sometimes obtained are rarely sustainable.
Simply shifting drug control resources from military to police forces will not provide an immediate answer, as police forces across the region remain abusive and corrupt and have also at times taken on disturbing paramilitary characteristics. Ultimately, police forces-as well as judiciaries-must be fundamentally reformed for the rule of law to take root. Lessons learned in recent post-confl ict situations for developing democratic policing include the importance of effective oversight, accountability and transparency, respect for human rights, the "demilitarization" of both the command structures and roles of police forces, and responsiveness to the communities they serve. However, all too often, in the face of crime and violence, long-term developmental reform issues necessary for reducing corruption and strengthening effective policing take a back seat to shortterm, hard-line policing tactics.
For example, in an effort to circumvent corruption, the U.S. government often creates specialized investigative units that primarily carry out investigations into drug-traffi cking networks. Participating offi cers are vetted, and intensive training is given to a specifi c group which can then be isolated from the rest of the force to prevent sensitive information from leaking out. These units by their very nature are secretive, and rarely held accountable. While specialized units have had some tactical successes, experience also shows that these units cannot be immunized against corruption and are frequently disbanded and replaced with yet other units. 
Human rights violations
In order to further its drug control policy, the U.S. government has forged alliances with military and police forces with questionable and even deplorable human rights records. Though sometimes the human rights problem is recognized, training and assistance is usually provided to recipient governments and security forces even before they have shown clear signs of political will to alter past patterns of abuse. Moreover, successive U.S. administrations have, at different times, downplayed or misrepresented human rights situations in order to obtain congressional support for counterdrug assistance. In some cases, the U.S. government is still supporting forces with a history of human rights violations and impunity. In others, U.S. policy directly results in human rights abuses.
In the fi nal analysis, it is morally wrong and ultimately counterproductive to provide U.S. assistance to any military or police force that operates outside the boundaries of the rule of law.
Concern about the impact of U.S. security assistance on human rights led members of Congress to place strict human rights conditions on the provision of U.S. counterdrug and other forms of security assistance. The Leahy amendment, named after Vermont's Senator Patrick Leahy, stipulates that no U.S. security assistance can be provided to foreign military or police units implicated in human rights violations unless effective measures are being taken to bring the case to justice. First passed in 1997, the Leahy amendment has also been included in subsequent foreign aid appropriations legislation, and defense appropriations legislation now has a version of it as well. This legislation has been helpful in raising the profi le of human rights issues with U.S. embassies and the U.S. military, and in some cases this has resulted in signifi cantly closer scrutiny of the human rights record of recipient forces.
Yet the amendment itself has only been invoked in a handful of cases, and its application is uneven. In some countries, U.S. embassies have failed to put into place even minimal procedures for vetting units for individuals implicated in human rights violations. In the case of Bolivia, suffi cient documentation exists in numerous cases that would justify the implementation of the Leahy amendment, yet this has not occurred. Nor do embassy offi cials object publicly when Bolivian military and police offi cials linked to atrocities are promoted. In Mexico, human rights monitors claim that the embassy database that keeps track of human rights violations is seriously incomplete.
Policy Recommendations
 Counterdrug activities carried out by the U.S. and other regional governments should be guided by the human rights standards established in the jurisprudence of the inter-American system.
 The Leahy amendment should be vigorously applied. The U.S. government should not provide any form of assistance to security forces that violate human rights and fail to bring alleged human rights violators to justice.
 The vetting procedures that need to be put in place to effectively implement the Leahy amendment should be thorough and serious. In addition, after-training tracking could be incorporated to monitor whether or not those who receive training go on to commit human rights abuses or become involved in acts of corruption.
 The Leahy amendment remains an unfunded mandate; suffi cient resources should be earmarked to encourage its effective implementation.
Restrictions on civil liberties
U.S. drug policy has also promoted the adoption of harsh antidrug laws that are at odds with basic international norms and standards of due process and undermine already tenuous civil liberties. In almost every country studied, such laws have been approved, often creating either courts or procedures that greatly limit due process guarantees, such as the presumption of innocence, the right to an adequate defense, and the requirement that the punishment be commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Such legislation is often modeled directly on U.S. laws; other times it goes even further as local offi cials seek to please Washington with harsh measures.
In some countries, U.S.-backed legislation was adopted in which the burden of proof for conviction of drug offenders was so low that local human rights lawyers complained that their defendants were forced to prove their innocence. Antidrug legislation, including mandatory minimum sentencing laws, and the use of numerical quotas for arrests, have fi lled the prisons of countries across the region with low-level offenders, or even innocent people, who have little access to adequate legal defense. In some countries, only a small percentage of those arrested are actually convicted, while in others conviction rates are astoundingly high. Pervasive corruption and weak judiciaries mean that major drug traffi ckers are rarely sanctioned. And if they are, they often benefi t from far more acceptable prison conditions, as they have the resources to purchase a range of amenities.
USAID provides economic and technical support to local judiciaries. However, U.S. justice sector support has sometimes included programs that work at crosspurposes. Justice sector reform efforts are essential in order both to guarantee respect for civil liberties and due process, and to ensure that those who are guilty of serious crimes are effectively prosecuted. USAID, the World Bank, and the InterAmerican Development Bank all support rule of law programs that assist local reform efforts, seek to increase access of the poor to the justice sector, and provide training and professional development. Past experience has shown that the political will for reform on the part of recipient governments is crucial, as is the role of civil society organizations in both maintaining momentum for reform and providing valuable input into the process.
Policy Recommendations
 U.S. and Latin American drug laws should be brought into compliance with international standards of due process and respect for human rights. U.S. counterdrug assistance should respect due process standards and reinforce the rule of law in criminal cases.
 Mandatory minimums should be eliminated and sentences adopted that correspond to the gravity of the crime committed. Major drug traffi ckers should face extended sentences; those at the lowest end of the drug-traffi cking chain should indeed be sanctioned, but on a different scale.
 More U.S. attention and assistance needs to be given to promoting justice sector reform and institutional strengthening across the region, with particular attention to civil liberties and due process issues.
Fostering political instability
It is in the interest of the United States to have stable, democratic governments in its hemisphere. Yet U.S. international drug control policies can have a profoundly destabilizing effect, economically as well as politically. Even when signifi cant social confl ict and political instability is generated by the implementation of drug policy, more often than not U.S. policymakers fail to adjust the policy to the realities-and consequences-on the ground. Particularly in the convulsive Andean region, U.S. drug policy may in fact be destabilizing democracies that are already quite fragile.
All too often, the use of "narcoterrorist" rhetoric in coca-producing countries identifi es small coca farmers as military threats and suggests that they are somehow related to global terrorist networks. It also paints them as criminals, rather than valid interlocutors, so that any efforts to seek dialogue and common ground are cast as illegitimate. This in turn marginalizes signifi cant sectors of the population and creates a situation in which confl ict and violence are almost inevitable. The political consequences of ignoring signifi cant sectors of society could be explosive.
In the wake of September 11, both the drug war and the Latin American region have lost political ground in Washington. illicit transborder activities as potential terrorist threats, including drug production and traffi cking, illegal migration, arms traffi cking and money laundering.
It is certainly possible that illicit transborder activities could be used to support terrorism, but Latin America is not the Middle East. Defi ning all of these problems as terrorist threats is unhelpful and potentially destabilizing. Taking the fervor over antiterrorism a step further is the U.S. Southern Command, which has now taken to calling drugs a "weapon of mass destruction." 8 This rhetoric promotes continuation of a failed approach and the notion that the United States, through its drug policy toward Latin America, must protect itself at any cost against this evil product emanating from the region.
Policy Recommendations
 The U.S. government should show greater fl exibility with regard to the counterdrug policies proposed or adopted by governments in the region, taking into account the socioeconomic and political situation on the ground. Deepening democracy and stability should be prioritized over short-term counterdrug gains.
 The present challenge for U.S. policymakers is to stop seeing the region through the counterterrorism lens, which distorts the view of real problems and threats in the region; use of the "narcoterrorist" rhetoric that has come to dominate present U.S. drug control policy should cease.
 Small farmers who produce crops for illicit drug production should not be stigmatized as criminal "narcofarmers" but rather be treated as valid interlocutors. One of the most powerful sticks used by Washington is the certifi cation process, described above. Recent legislative changes have made the process somewhat less offensive. Fundamentally, however, these changes have failed to alter the approach of having an annual scorecard, on which the largest consumer of illicit drugs in the world grades the progress of other countries in seeking to limit its supply. U.S. trade benefi ts to the Andean region are also now directly linked to achieving coca eradication and other counterdrug goals, as explicitly stated in the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Enforcement Act.
Undermining national governments' decisionmaking
Concern with the animosity generated by the U.S. certifi cation process led the OAS to develop its own Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), which many countries see as a more palatable alternative. It is a transparent processinformation provided by countries for the MEM evaluation is public and easily obtained. 9 While the MEM process also has A Latin American coalition of countries willing to debate alternative policies would fi nd echo with these countries at the level of the UN and could contribute signifi cantly to the development of a more humane and effective approach in the region.
Policy Recommendations
 The annual certifi cation process should be eliminated; more carrot and less stick is needed in U.S. drug policy.
 U.S. trade agreements should be delinked from explicit counterdrug objectives, in particular coca and poppy eradication targets.
 U.S. drug policy should, ultimately, be a multilateral effort coordinated through the UN and the OAS and in close collaboration with other donor countries, particularly the European Union.
 The formation of an informal coalition of like-minded countries in Latin America and the Caribbean would provide an important forum for debating drug policy alternatives.
Transparency and accountability
Issues of transparency and accountability are not only relevant in the countries receiving U.S. assistance-lack of transparency and effective oversight pervades U.S. assistance and training programs as well. A myriad of government agencies and programs are involved in illicit drug control efforts, which makes determining expenditures and monitoring programs diffi cult. Information on military and police programs is particularly hard to obtain.
Inadequate reporting on U.S. military and police assistance and training programs impedes both the transparency of U.S. efforts and accountability when they fail to meet their desired objectives or generate negative consequences. Both congressional monitoring and the ability of civil society organizations to evaluate U.S.-backed programs are essential to ensuring the effi cient and effective use of resources. They are also necessary to ensure that U.S. funding furthers U.S. policy objectives and that such assistance is not used in a way that is detrimental to the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles.
U.S. legislative oversight of certain drug control programs is a problem and is particularly ineffective with regard to Defense Department and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) programs. Apart from mandating the Foreign Military Training Report, which provides annual data on U.S. military training of foreign troops, public hearings that seriously evaluate the effectiveness of Pentagon counterdrug efforts are needed. Likewise, while DEA offi cials are often called to testify on drug-traffi cking trends and the like, meaningful evaluation of the success or failure of their efforts in a given country should be undertaken. Monitoring U.S. police assistance programs and the content of those programs is particularly diffi cult. No systematic reporting requirements exist, and agencies such as the DEA often refuse to provide even the most basic information.
If the ability of civil society groups to monitor U.S. drug policy is diffi cult in the United States, it is next to impossible in Latin America and the Caribbean. Very little information is made available by either regional governments or U.S. embassies to local civil society actors on the nuts and bolts of U.S. assistance or local operations.  Greater efforts should be undertaken in the region by U.S. embassies to reach out to local NGOs and other civil society organizations in order to provide more information and seek more input into the drug-policy making process.
Crop eradication and alternative development programs
This book presents powerful evidence that forced coca eradication efforts are futile in the long run. In every case studied, shortterm gains have been quickly reversed.
Crop eradication efforts have stimulated production in new areas, creating even greater challenges for the long term, as coca production spreads. Production has also shifted due to changes in the drugtraffi cking industry. Yet the costs of the policy are high-forced eradication efforts, and in particular aerial fumigation, often have dire consequences, generating social unrest, instability and violence.
Poverty, poor conditions for sustainable agricultural production, and the growing of crops for illicit drugs go hand-in-hand. Promoting integrated economic development in these areas is not impossible; however, the term "crop substitution" is used less and less frequently. As simply replacing coca with another crop or product is usually not economically viable, donors increasingly talk of sustainable, and equitable, development that will slowly reduce farmers' dependence on coca cultivation by creating the conditions for improved agriculture, employment and income generation more broadly. They also recognize the importance of local participation, building on farmers' existing knowledge. This leads to projects that are more appropriate for local conditions and ensuring local "buy-in."
Increasingly, international donors are explicitly recognizing that simultaneous forced eradication and alternative development efforts are incompatible. The repressive nature of the former greatly limits, or hinders altogether, the cooperation needed for the latter. One UN document notes: "In areas where alternative development programs have not created viable alternative income opportunities, the application of forced eradication might endanger the success of alternative development programs."
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The German government's foreign aid agency, GTZ, points out that when poverty is the root cause of production, repressive eradication measures are inappropriate and counterproductive. Based on its extensive experience working in coca-growing regions of the Andes, GTZ concludes that even though substituting the safety net that coca production provides may take time, that approach-without the threat of eradication-"is the only manner to achieve a sustainable reduction in drug crop cultivation." 12 When dealing with smallscale coca producers, eradication targets can be agreed upon and met only when other sources of income are put in place. Development experts also point out that repressive measures against coca producers raise prices on the market, which in turn stimulates new cultivation. 13 Incorporating these "lessons learned" implies a fundamental shift in U.S. policy. It means developing a new and more equitable relationship with families involved in coca and poppy production, accepting them as legitimate partners in development efforts, and removing the threat of forced eradication. It also means investing more resources in economic development, particularly in rural sectors, and recognizing the need for local governments to have greater economic decisionmaking ability. Finally, strengthening democratic institutions at the local level is essential to ensuring the sustainability of development efforts in poor rural areas.
Two signifi cant steps should be taken to reduce the harm caused by present drug control policies. First, cultivation of coca for traditional uses should not result in criminal sanctions. Second, coca and poppy production by small producers should be decriminalized; small growers should be considered "economic victims" with few viable options for survival, rather than criminals.
14 This approach takes as its starting point the principle that all individuals have a right to a life with dignity and hence should not be deprived of their only income source. Innovative discussion is beginning among some European government offi cials and drug policy analysts as to how this approach-what some call a "pro-poor drug control policy" 15 -could be implemented in practice.
Policy Recommendations
 The U.S. government should adopt a "pro-poor" drug control policy, integrating the lessons learned by GTZ, UNDP, and other international donors in its approach to development assistance.
 Aerial and other forms of forced eradication should be eliminated, as should coca and poppy eradication targets. Forced eradication more broadly should be replaced with voluntary crop reduction efforts carried out in accordance with the local population and only when viable alternatives for income generation exist. The provision of development aid to growers should be completely independent from eradication goals.
 Coca and poppy production by small, subsistence-level producers should be decriminalized.
 U.S. economic support and technical assistance for economic development, particularly in rural areas, should be increased signifi cantly across Latin America and the Caribbean.
Toward an Alternative Policy
A constructive middle ground lies between the drug "hawks"-those advocating notolerance, supply-side strategies-and the drug "legalizers." The United States needs to be both tough and smart about drugsbut this will require new approaches.
Out of all the links in the chain of drug production and traffi cking that could be targeted, drug crops like coca leaves or opium poppy provide the smallest return for the effort. Farmers receive only a tiny fraction of the retail prices of illicit drugs on U.S. streets, making only enough money to survive. Growing alternative crops produces even less income, so as long as there is demand for drugs, there will be production of drug crops.
Forced eradication is an endless and counterproductive game. Small producers without alternative livelihoods will simply replant. If subjected to repeat eradication, they plant in new areas, taking drug production and all of its corresponding problems along with them. And, if temporarily successful in driving up the price of the coca leaf, more people start planting to share in the economic gain.
The United States must fi ght the illicit drug trade, but there are more effective ways to do this than attempting to wipe out drug A constructive middle ground lies between the drug "hawks"-those advocating no-tolerance, supply-side strategiesand the drug "legalizers."
The United States needs to be both tough and smart about drugs-but this will require new approaches.
crops. Interdiction of drugs closer to their fi nal destination is less costly to us, and more costly to traffi ckers. We need to step up U.S. efforts to follow the money, since that is the most dangerous and corrupting part of the drug trade. We should continue to fi nd new ways to track and disrupt money laundering while we capture and prosecute the big-fi sh traffi ckers who are making huge profi ts, rather than the small fry whose incarceration has no effect on traffi cking.
To discourage the cultivation of drug crops, it would also be more effective for the United States to support long-term integrated rural development. We are now paying the price of decades of social marginalization, economic abandonment and state neglect of the rural sector. We can work with host nations to develop strategies to incorporate rural areas into the country's life and economy.
In addition, we must strengthen the civilian institutions that will combat drug traffi cking now and in the future. Police forces need support, including training, resources, and reform, if they are to confront criminal activity; using military forces in their stead weakens and distorts the roles of both. Judicial reform and strengthening must go hand-in-hand with police reform-functioning police and judicial systems are needed to combat drug traffi cking. The United States must learn to have patience and invest for the long haul in institutional reform.
The U.S. should not encourage military forces, in the name of expediency, to take on policing roles. And in nations where the military has assumed policing functions because the police are either too corrupt or incapable of confronting drug crimes, the U.S. must support the police reform needed to allow the police to reassume their appropriate role.
What would have the greatest impact on drug production and traffi cking, however, would be to reduce demand. Study after study shows that as long as we consume drugs, someone will produce them, whether overseas or within the United States. We need to reorient our priorities to focus intensely on prevention and treatment in the United States.
Finally, we need new indicators for success. Tons seized and acres eradicated only tell us that we are doing something, not that we are having an impact on drug consumption in the United States. We need indicators that are linked to what we are actually trying to achieve-reduced drug consumption.
Being honest about the numbers and refocusing U.S. counterdrug efforts in the ways described above has a far greater potential for reducing drug consumption in the United States while mitigating the damage caused by the drug war in Latin America. We can be both tough and smart on drugs. 
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